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UNCONSTITUTIONAL STRIP SEARCH POLICIES:
REDRESSIBILITY'S STATE OF UNDRESS AFTER
CITY OF LOS ANGELES V. LYONS
Nancy Hark'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court case of City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,2
has had far reaching effects on civil rights standing in federal
courts. Standing had historically been granted to a plaintiff who
could show that he or she had suffered an injury and that the
injury would be redressed by the intervention of the court. The
federal courts formerly had an array of remedies at their disposal
to prevent abusive behavior by state actors; among that array was
the power to issue an injunction. Lyons held, however, that the
federal courts could not issue an injunction against a state police
actor unless a plaintiff, who had been injured by this actor in the
past, could prove he would be injured again in the same way .
What this decision did was to insulate some police
behavior from the injunctive power of the federal courts, no
matter how blatantly unconstitutional the behavior. This behavior
has ranged from the original subject matter of the Lyons case,
lethal choke holds of arrestees in California,5 to unconstitutional
detainment of arrestees in the Seventh Circuit,
6 to racial profiling,7
to the wide-spread practice of strip searching all arrestees.
8
The majority of the Court in Lyons seemed to believe
Justice Marshall was exaggerating when in his dissent he
B.S. 1982, Hofstra University, phi beta kappa, J.D. Candidate 2003,
Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, Touro Law Review Editor-in-
Chief, 2002-2003. The author wishes to thank Hon. George C. Pratt for his
wisdom, and for his help and encouragement with this article.
2 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
3 See cases cited infra notes 55-57.
4 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101-09.
3 See infra notes 177, 179-81 and accompanying text.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 184-190.
7 See infra text accompanying notes 191.
" See discussion infra Part III, V.
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predicted that the decision would immunize continuing
unconstitutional practices as long as no plaintiff could prove
future injury under that practice. 9 He stated, "[u]nder the view
espoused by the majority today, if the police adopt a policy of
'shoot to kill' or a policy of shooting 1 out of 10 suspects, the
federal courts will be powerless to enjoin its continuation. The
federal judicial power is now limited to levying a toll for such a
systematic constitutional violation." 10  Justice Marshall's
predictions may be taken more seriously today than they were in
1983 because of events that have occurred since that time, such as
the Abner Louima incident," and the Amadou Diallo shooting,'
2
and a growing realization that not all police action is benevolent.
In the Second Circuit, Police and Sheriff's departments
have repeatedly been told by federal courts that the policy of strip
searching misdemeanant arrestees, when there is no reasonable
suspicion that the arrestee is carrying contraband or weapons is a
Fourth Amendment violation.' 3 Although some of the plaintiffs
in these cases received damage awards, the municipalities, in
general, have not been deterred by the damage awards.
Additionally, since the Lyons decision, an injunction in a strip
search case is almost impossible to pursue because of the
heightened standing barrier in federal court.
The ongoing strip search policies become a reflection of a
much larger problem: a loss of confidence in the way the process
works. Simply put, the average person believes that after a
9 Id. at 137 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
10 Id. (internal citations omitted).
1 Joseph P. Fried, Sentencing in Louima Case, N.Y. TIMES, December 19,
1999, Sec. 4 at 2 ("former police officer convicted of torturing Abner Louima
in a police stationhouse bathroom in 1997 was sentenced to 30 years in
Prison.").
12 Diallo Murder Trial Set to Begin on Jan. 31, N.Y. TIMES, December 30,
1999, at B6 ("The officers fired 41 bullets at Mr. Diallo, who was unarmed,
striking him 19 times, as he stood in the vestibule of his Bronx apartment
building . . ).
13 U.S. CONST. amend IV states in pertinent part: "The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
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federal court determines that a given conduct is unconstitutional,
then the actor will stop the behavior. If citizens cannot look to
the federal courts to halt unconstitutional behavior by state actors
acting under color of law, if this loop-hole that was created by
Lyons is left open, then the determination of our constitutional
rights is left in the hands of our police force instead of in the
hands of our courts. Instead of empowering the states in the
realm of police power, the Court inadvertently has permitted
practices more akin to a "Police State."
This article will address the problem with the barrier
raised by Lyons in obtaining standing for injunctive relief,
namely, that the appropriate remedy for unconstitutional policies
of strip searching misdemeanant arrestees not suspected of hiding
contraband, is to enjoin the continued use of those policies. The
second part of this article will explore how damage awards
against municipalities have not proven effective deterrents for this
particular behavior. Finally, the article will address a possible
alternate solution to the problem, which is to utilize the state
courts to issue injunctions against state officials. While a federal
court is the forum where one would expect to vindicate any
constitutional claim, the state courts, which are also empowered
to hear constitutional challenges,1 4 are not subject to the same
standing barriers as the federal courts, and are possibly the best
forums currently available to address these problems. 15
II. BACKGROUND: CITY OF Los ANGELES V. LYONS
Adolph Lyons was driving his car with a broken tail-light.
Officers of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) pulled
him over for this "unlawful" behavior, and told him to get out of
his vehicle. At that point, something went terribly wrong. Lyons
claimed that he was cooperating fully and did not resist the
police, but he was placed in a choke hold; a police officer placed
his nightstick or forearm across Lyons' throat, and from behind
14 See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 391 (1947) (explaining that under Article
IV of the Constitution, state are obligated to enforce federal law).
15 See discussion infra Part VI.
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applied extreme force. This force stopped the flow of blood to
Lyons' brain and almost proved fatal. Lyons suffered permanent
injury to his larynx. 16
Lyons sued in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,7 seeking damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory
relief, claiming that the LAPD's choke hold policy was
unconstitutional.' 8 The district court dismissed his claims for
injunctive and declaratory relief without reasons.' 9 The Ninth
Circuit, assuming that the district court had taken this action
because of the Supreme Court holdings of O'Shea v. Littleton,2°
and Rizzo v. Goode,21 distinguished those decisions, and
reinstated the claims.22 The City petitioned the Supreme Court
and the Court denied certiorari, (Lyons 1), over a dissent by
Justice White.23 On remand, the parties agreed to separate the
damage claim to await a later trial,24 and the district court entered
a preliminary injunction to enjoin the LAPD's "use of both the
carotid-artery and bar arm holds under circumstances which do
not threaten death or serious bodily injury." 25 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed.26 Now, with the injunction claim separated from the
damages claim, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, (Lyons
11).27 The Supreme Court reversed the injunction by a vote of
16 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 97-98, 114-15.
17 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states, "Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory, or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other
proper proceeding for redress ....
18 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 97-98.
9 Id. at 98-99.
20 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
21 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
22 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 99.
23 449 U.S. 934-35 (1980) (White, J., dissenting).
24 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105 n.6.
2s Id. at 99-100.
26 Id. at 100.
27 Id. Lyons II is the only case that is relevant to the remainder of the
discussion, and will hereafter be referred to only as Lyons.
366 [Vol 18
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five to four.28 Justice White wrote the opinion for the Court,
joined by Justices Powell, Burger, O'Connor and Rehnquist.
Justice Marshall's dissent was joined by Justices Blackmun,
Brennan, and Stevens.
A. Mootness
The Court's decision is composed of three distinct
holdings, all related to standing. As a threshold issue, the Court
declared that the claim was not moot. Although the police had
voluntarily abandoned the choke hold policy, it had only decided
to do so for a six-month period. 29 Lyon's argued for dismissal on
the grounds of mootness, arguing that certiorari had been
improvidently granted. However, the City argued that the claim
was not moot because it could decide to reinstate the policy after
the six month moratorium.30 Some commentators believe that the
Court's analysis here forever confused the doctrines of mootness
and of standing. 31 "By displacing mootness with standing
analysis, Lyons apparently erects a heightened barrier to the
protection of federal rights in suits for injunctive relief. 
" 32
B. Actual Injury Not Sufficient, Must Have a Threat
of Future Injury
The first holding concerning standing was that the plaintiff
did not have a "case or controversy" under Article III, because
Lyons only had a past injury, and could not prove a real and
immediate threat of future injury. 33 The Court said that Lyons'
past exposure to the harm did not entitle him to seek prospective
injunctive relief because the relief he was requesting would not
2 Id. at 95.
29 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101.
30 id.
31 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and the
Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 25-27 (1984).
32/d. at 26.
33 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105.
2002 367
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redress his injury. 3  The Court explained the showing that a
plaintiff must make to have a case or controversy: "the plaintiff
must show that 'he has or is immediately in danger of sustaining
some direct injury.'" 35 The plaintiff here had sustained an injury,
but the court glossed over the language it had just used.
C. No Future Injury: Displacing Mootness with
Standing
Second, looking to the possibility of future injury, the
Court said that it found Lyons' argument "incredible" that the
police would pull him over again and subject him to another
choke hold; he would have to admit either that he was going to
break the law or resist the police, or that the police routinely
choked everyone they encountered for no apparent reason.
36
The Court downplayed the argument that no plaintiff
would ever be able to get standing to enjoin this particularly
dangerous police behavior because, it said, an injured plaintiff
could always get damages (or his relatives could if he was
dead).37 The Court also rejected the request for standing under
the "capable of repetition yet evading review" doctrine because,
it said, that doctrine only applies when a claim is moot and if the
unconstitutional conduct might happen again to Lyons, not just to
any person.
38
The Court explained the "capable of repetition" doctrine
as set out in Sosna v. Iowa, where it said "there must be a named
plaintiff who has a case or controversy at the time the complaint
is filed. 39 It seems that Lyons did not have much time to
challenge the policy while in the choke hold; it was over in a
matter of seconds. In Roe v. Wade,4° the Court had invoked the
"capable of repetition" doctrine, even though the named plaintiff
14 Id. at 101.
" Id. at 101-02 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).36 Id. at 106.
37 Id. at 111.
3s Lyons, 461 U.S. at 109.
39419 U.S. 393, 402 (1975).
40 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973).
368 [Vol 18
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was no longer pregnant when the case reached the Supreme
Court. According to one commentator, "[in light of public
policy concerns militating in favor of judicial resolution, the
Court in Roe was satisfied to recognize that 'pregnancy often
comes more than once to the same woman.' On that basis, it
found the case not moot." 41 If nine months is too short a period
of time to get review before a claim is moot, then several
seconds, the time frame of a choke hold, is definitely too short a
period of time, and the same public policy should have militated
in favor of resolving the issue in Lyons.
In a more recent Supreme Court case, County of Riverside
v. McLaughlin,42 the standing technicalities for injunctive relief
were clarified. The plaintiff brought an action on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated to enjoin the county's policy
of detaining individuals who were arrested without warrants, and
were held beyond the two-day period prescribed by law without
giving them a probable-cause hearing.43 Because McLaughlin
had already been released from detainment, the county filed a
motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff did not have standing
for injunctive relief under the Lyons reasoning." While the
motion to dismiss was pending, McLaughlin found three
additional plaintiffs who were still in custody, and amended the
complaint to add these plaintiffs. 45 The Supreme Court found
that because there were those three additional plaintiffs, who had
a live controversy at the time of the amended complaint, there
was Article III standing for injunctive relief in this case.46 The
Court said, "some claims are so inherently transitory" that the
"relation back" doctrine should be used to preserve the claim for
review .47
The distinction between Lyons and McLaughlin is merely
form over substance. In McLaughlin, the Court used the fiction of
41 Fallon supra note 31, at 27 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 125).
42 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
431d. at 47.
"Id. at 48.451 Id. at 49.
46 Id. at 51-52.
47 McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 52.
2002 369
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the relation back doctrine to fix everything, but it did not change
anything. If the justification of needing a "live case or
controversy" is that the plaintiff must have a true stake in the
outcome "in order to 'assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues' necessary for the proper
resolution of constitutional questions," 48 the additional plaintiffs
had no more 'concrete adverseness' than McLaughlin by the time
the trial process began. McLaughlin could not show a likelihood
of future injury, but the three new plaintiffs, who were released a
day or two after the amended complaint, did not have to show a
likelihood of future injury. The Court said Article III requires a
"live controversy" at the time the complaint is filed, however, by
the time of resolution, all the Court will have is a past injury that
is redressible. The technicalities imposed are not imposed by
Article III, but by the Court's tortured interpretation of Article
III.
D. Federalism
The last standing consideration in Lyons was the paean to
federalism. The Court said that it was not the role of federal
courts to dictate to state police officials what they should and
should not do in a particular situation. 49 "The need for a proper
balance between state and federal authority counsels restraint in
the issuance of injunctions against state officials engaged in the
administration of the state's criminal laws in the absence of
irreparable injury which is both great and immediate. "5 The
Court meant irreparable injury to Adolph Lyons, not to the
population as a whole.
Between 1975 and the time of the Court's decision in
Lyons, sixteen people had died as a result of the Los Angeles
police choke hold policy. 5' These injuries were irreparable to
them. To borrow a standing doctrine from the First Amendment
48 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
49 Id. at 112.
so Id.
s" Id. at 115-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
[Vol 18370
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area, where the rules of standing are less stringently applied
because of the importance to us as a nation for speech to be
protected, perhaps Lyons should have invoked the overbreadth
doctrine; 52 he should have argued that the policy had a chilling
effect on "life." The Court seems to be saying, 'just don't break
the law, and you won't have to worry about getting murdered by
the police.'
E. The Dissent
Justice Marshall explained, insightfully, the impossible
standing barrier the Court had just imposed:
The Court today holds that a federal court is
without power to enjoin the enforcement of the
city's policy, no matter how flagrantly
unconstitutional it may be. Since no one can show
that he will be choked in the future, no one - not
even a person who, like Lyons, has almost been
choked to death - has standing to challenge the
continuation of the policy.
53
Justice Marshall argued that never before did a litigant
have to prove standing for each type of relief sought; all a litigant
had to do to have Article III standing was show a personal stake
in the dispute, different or greater than just a member of the
population as a whole.5 4 The Court has always asked 1) whether
the plaintiff "personally has suffered some actual or threatened
injury," 55 2) whether the injury "fairly can be traced to the
52 The overbreadth doctrine is an exception to ordinary standing
requirements, and is justified by the recognition that free expression may be
inhibited as much by the threatened use of power as by the actual use of the
power. See City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 798 (1984); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940).
5' Lyons, 461 U.S. at 113 (Marshall J., dissenting).
4 Id. at 128.




Hark: Strip Search Policies
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2002
TOURO LAWREVIEW
challenged action," 56 and 3) whether plaintiff's injury "is likely
to be redressed by a favorable decision. " 57 This was always the
criteria, and there was never a reason to fragment the inquiry for
each type of claim. "The Court's decision turns these well-
accepted principles on their heads by now requiring a separate
inquiry with respect to each request for relief."58  Justice
Marshall pointed out that the majority had drastically altered the
entire jurisprudence of standing. 5
He continued that this fragmentation was "inconsistent
with the way the federal courts have treated remedial issues since
the merger of law and equity."60 Deciding if a plaintiff was
entitled to an injunction was an issue to be determined after a full
hearing of the merits, not an issue to be addressed on the
pleadings. 61 "There are dangers inherent in any doctrine that
permits a court to foreclose any consideration of [a] remedy by
ruling on the pleadings that a plaintiff lacks standing to seek it. 
" 62
As one commentator phrased it; "although the fragmentation of
the standing inquiry into separate hurdles was entirely
unprecedented, the Court portrayed itself as choiceless. "63
F. Discussion
There was very little precedent to support the Court's
decision. The first case relied on by the majority was Rizzo v.
Goode,6 where the district court had issued detailed orders to the
Philadelphia police department concerning new policies of dealing
with citizen complaints on a day to day basis, and had reserved
56 Id. (citing Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,
41(1976)).
57 Id. (citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 38).
58 Lyons, 46 U.S. at 130-31 (Marshall J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 130.
6 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 131.
63 Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47
BUFF. L. REv. 1275, 1339 (1999).
Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 362.
[Vol 18372
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continuing jurisdiction in order to oversee the implementation of
the new procedures.65 The Supreme Court did not approve of
such a drastic interference with a police department's internal
operating procedure. 66  Furthermore, there was a substantive
problem in the Rizzo case. The Rizzo Court found that the theory
underlying the plaintiff's claims was not that the city had a policy
of misconduct, but only that the city had failed to act in the face
of statistical evidence. 67 The Court in Rizzo believed that the case
was actually a controversy between the entire citizenry of
Philadelphia and the police department, and as such, did not
present a concrete case or controversy to meet Article III
requirements.68 According to another commentator:
There was a considerable difference between the
relief requested in Rizzo on the one hand and in
Lyons on the other. The plaintiffs in Rizzo sought a
substantial restructuring of police department
procedures. The plaintiff in Lyons, by contrast,
asked the district court to do no more than what
courts traditionally have done and have done
effectively: to enjoin the defendant from continuing
a particular course of unlawful conduct. 69
The second case relied on by the Lyon's majority was
O'Shea v. Littleton, which was a class action suit brought against
the prosecutor, state judiciary and various other officials, alleging
discriminatory practices in the criminal justice system. 70  The
Court in O'Shea said that the plaintiffs were requesting an
injunction that seemed to conflict directly with the doctrine
underlying Younger v. Harris.71  The Court believed an
65 Id. at 365; see also id. at 365 n.2.
66 Id. at 366.
67 Id. at 375-76 (emphasis added).
6 1Id. at 371.
69 Fallon, supra note 31, at 44.
70 O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 490.
71 Id. at 500; Younger, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971) (holding that a defendant in a
state criminal proceeding cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts
until the proceeding is concluded absent the threat of irreparable injury).
2002 373
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injunction of this type would be "intrusive and unworkable. 
"72
"The objection is to unwarranted anticipatory interference in the
state criminal process by means of continuous or piecemeal
interruption of the state proceedings by litigation in the federal
courts . . . . 73 The Court found the constant monitoring
imposed by the injunction "antipathetic to established principles
of comity. 74
On the other hand, Justice Marshall, in Lyons, cited
numerous decisions where the Court had approved of the issuance
of injunctions by federal courts against state or municipal police
departments.75  Justice Marshall pointed out that with the
exception of the enjoining of state criminal proceedings, the
Court had never limited its reach over cities and municipalities.
"Whatever the precise scope of the Younger doctrine may be, the
concerns of comity and federalism that counsel restraint when a
federal court is asked to enjoin a state criminal proceeding simply
do not apply to an injunction directed solely at a police
department. "76
It would seem to follow logically from the Lyons decision
that a federal court will not enjoin state police actors, however,
that is not what happens in practice. Police departments are
enjoined by federal courts when a law-abiding plaintiff can show
a threat of future injury. The key seems to be that the standing
requirement for likelihood of future injury is impossible to obtain
if the injury occurred because of the plaintiff's "criminal"
behavior, such as having a broken tail-light.
Compare Lyons with the case of Roe v. City of New
York.78 The plaintiffs in Roe were intravenous drug users taking
part in the City's needle exchange program.79 While their drug
72 O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 500.
73 Id.
74 1d. at 501.
" Lyons, 461 U.S. at 133 n.23. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 135.
77 See, e.g., Roe v. City of New York, 151 F. Supp. 2d 495, 503 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (citing cases); infra text accompanying notes 78-84.
78 151 F. Supp. 2d at 504-08.
79 id. at 499.
[Vol 18374
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use was not legal, the exchange program was. It was alleged that
the police were arresting the plaintiffs for possessing hypodermic
needles on their way in or out of the program.80 These plaintiffs
were able to get standing for injunctive relief against the police
department for arresting them in this manner because the activity
they wanted to engage in was legal, therefore they could
adequately show a likelihood of future injury. 81 No mention was
made of the federalism concern raised in Lyons. No one
questioned that a federal court was enjoining a state police entity.
It seems that once a plaintiff who is attempting to engage in legal
activity can show a case or controversy and a threat of even
speculative future injury, then the standing requirements for
injunctive relief are satisfied. What should be noted is that in
Roe, the plaintiffs' claims were of two isolated arrests that had
occurred more than a year apart by different officers and in
different boroughs of the City of New York. 82 In determining the
standing issue, the court relied in part on a Fifth Circuit case,
Hernandez v. Cremer,8 3 which stated that courts should not be
reluctant to find that the plaintiff will be subject to future police
conduct placing him at risk of injury when "the injury alleged to
have been inflicted did not result from an individual's
disobedience of official instructions [or any other form of
misconduct]." 84 The court said this was the "critical factual
distinction" from the Lyons decision.
85
One begins to wonder if the Court merely does not want
to "reward" a plaintiff with an injunction if all that plaintiff has
to do to avoid future injury is keep out of trouble. But, what
happens if the trouble is not all the fault of the plaintiff? How
does this fit in with the racial profiling cases? How does this fit
in with the decision of Whren v. United States,86 and the
o Id. at 500.
SI Id. at 501-02.
2 Id. at 502.
83 913 F.2d 230, 234-35 (5th Cir. 1990).
84 Id. at 234.
85 Roe, 151 F. Supp. 2d at 503.
86 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
2002 375
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constitutionality of pretext arrests? How will it all fit together
with Atwater v. City of Lago Vista?
87
In Whren, the Court held that the police do not need a
subjectively reasonable motive to stop someone in their vehicle,
only probable cause that there was some actual violation of the
law. 88 "We have never held, outside the context of inventory
search or administrative inspection, that an officer's motive
invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth
Amendment." 89  The actual violations that police can stop
someone for include, of course, misdemeanors. It was an open
question if the New York Constitution would be interpreted to
afford more rights than the U.S. Constitution in the area of
pretext stops, however, the New York Court of Appeals has
recently adopted Whren as the law of this state. 9°
In Atwater, decided last term, the Supreme Court held that
the police had discretion to arrest misdemeanants as long as there
was probable cause that the person had broken the law in their
presence; any law, including a seat belt law. 91 Recently, Justice
Ginsberg, joined by Justice Stevens, Justice O'Connor, and
Justice Breyer, voiced some concern regarding the Court's recent
line of Fourth Amendment decisions.92 She stated that given the
holding of Whren, the decision in Atwater should be reconsidered
if in practice it leads to "'an epidemic of unnecessary minor-
offense arrests,'" something discounted by the majority in the
Atwater opinion.93  Taking that analysis one step further, the
holding of Atwater and Whren, given the holding in Lyons, adds
up to: the Supreme Court has put the actions of police
departments beyond the reach of the federal courts if the police
violate our civil rights every time we forget to wear our seat
belts.
87 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
88 Whren, 517 U.S. at 812-13.
'9 Id. at 812.
90 People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341, 346 (2001).
91 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 327.
92 See Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772-73 (2001) (Ginsberg, J.,
concurring).
93 Id. at 773 (citing Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353).
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I believe that. Whren is a dangerous decision. It will lead
to many more police encounters with innocent citizens, and things
will go wrong. Whren combined with Lyons is severely
dangerous, for there will be no accountability if and when things
go wrong routinely. Whren, Lyons and Atwater taken all together
have given away the farm.94
Somehow, there does not seem to be a huge line
separating misdemeanants from everyday ordinary citizens
engaged in legal activities. That is quintessentially the problem;
misdemeanants are all of us. Although we are not often arrested
for the behavior, we all have the expectation that if we are
arrested our civil rights will not be violated.
III. THE EFFECT OF LYONS IN NEW YORK: STRIP SEARCH
POLICIES
One day you can be a perfectly upstanding citizen, worthy
of the full protection of the law, the next day you can be arrested
for something as innocuous as having an unlicensed dog. 95
Suddenly, you are a misdemeanant. 96  If you are an arrested
misdemeanant, your chances are very good, under the local
policy, that you will be subjected to an unconstitutional strip and
94 For example, here is a hypothetical situation: A teenager, who is driving
his mother's Mercedes is pulled over on a pretext; the police do not believe
that this teenager could own such a car. They ask for his license and
registration, and find that he is driving with a learner's permit,, a
misdemeanor. They handcuff the teen, but inadvertently hurt his arm, he
begins to protest and struggle. The police start to get annoyed so they place
him in a choke hold, which makes the boy struggle even more, involuntarily,
because his body is experiencing the "fight or flight" response. He starts
writhing and kicking. The police, subjectively believing that he is resisting
arrest, shoot him and the boy dies. The boy's parents might be entitled to
damages, but they would not be entitled to an injunction.
95 See Huck v. City of Newburgh, 275 A.D.2d 343, 344, 712 N.Y.S.2d 149,
151 (2d Dep't 2000).
96 N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAw §§ 140.10(l)(a) and (2) (McKinney 2001)
("officer may arrest when officer has probable cause to believe any offense has
been committed in his presence and probable cause to' believe person to be
arrested committed the offense").
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body cavity search. At that point, it would be too late to try to
get a court to issue an injunction unless you happen to carry one
around with you. You are now left with the consolation of being
able to seek damages in a federal court, but you will not have
standing in that same court to challenge the future use of this
policy. While, concededly, it is not the most serious problem
facing our world today, it has affected many people. In the
words of Judge Pratt, strip searches are "an intrusion into
personal dignity and privacy . . . that for some people at least
might cause serious emotional distress. A search of this type...
has been characterized . . as demeaning, dehumanizing,
undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing,
repulsive, [and] signifying degradation and submission.
" 9
Before Lyons, one of the first courts in this country to hold
unconstitutional the policy of strip searching all misdemeanant
arrestees, even when there is no reasonable basis to believe that
the arrestee is hiding contraband or weapons, was the Eastern
District of New York in Sala v. County of Suffolk. 98 That case
occurred in 1978, before the Lyons decision, and was one of only
a few cases that research has uncovered on the subject where an
injunction issued. 99 The decision, by Judge Pratt, is still quoted
97 Tinetti v. Wittke, 479 F. Supp. 486, 491 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (citing Sala v.
County of Suffolk, No. 75-CV-486 (E.D.N.Y. Nov 11, 1978) (unpublished
transcript Pratt, J.)), afid, 620 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1980).
98 See Sala v. County of Suffolk, 604 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1979) (affirming
district court decision on other grounds), vacated and remanded by 446 U.S.
903 (1980). The Second Circuit decision in the case revolved around the
government's entitlement to "good-faith" immunity from suit in § 1983 cases,
a question that had been left open in Monell v. New York Dep't of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Sala, 604 F.2d at 210. The Supreme Court
vacated and remanded the Sala case for reconsideration under Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), which had been decided while the Sala
case was on appeal. 466 U.S. at 903. Owen held that a municipality may not
assert the "good-faith" of its officers as a defense to liability under § 1983.
445 U.S. at 638.
99 See discussion infra at Part V.
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today throughout the country"°° as courts continually find these
policies to be violative of the Fourth Amendment. 101
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently held
since 1986, in Weber v. Dell,'°2 that strip and body cavity
searches conducted on misdemeanant arrestees, when there is no
reasonable cause to suspect that the arrestee is carrying
contraband or weapons on his or her person, is a constitutional
violation of that person's Fourth Amendment rights to be free of
unwarranted searches. 
0 3
In Weber, the court also held that the law was clearly
established regarding blanket strip searches, and that the officials
implementing such a policy were not entitled to qualified
immunity under section § 1983.1o4 Qualified immunity is a major
issue in § 1983 cases, since officials are given great leeway in
using their discretion. 05 What is very clear, however, is that an
official is charged with knowing the law, especially the law as
handed down by the Supreme Court and the law of the circuit. 106
The Weber court held that although the circuit court had not
directly ruled on the issue, at least eleven circuit court decisions
had so held, and there could be no objective reasonableness to the
official conduct. 0 7
The unconstitutionality of blanket strip searches was again
made clear by the Second Circuit two years later in the case of
Walsh v. Franco.0 8 In Weber and Walsh, the court said that the
police could justify these searches only by taking into account the
surrounding circumstances of the arrest and the nature of the
'0 See infra note 237.
'0' See discussion infra at Part V.
'02 804 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom. County of Monroe v.
Weber, 483 U.S. 1020 (1987).
'03 d. at 802.
'oId. at 803-04.
os See 2 IVAN BODENSTEINER AND ROSALIE LEVINSON, STATE & LoC GOV'T
Civ RIGHTS LIAB §1A:05 77-303 (West Group 2000 & Supp. 2002) (discussing
qualified immunity).
' See id. at 91.
"o7 Weber, 804 F.2d at 803-04.
'o' 849 F.2d 66 (1988).
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crime charged.' 09 The circuit court evaluated the strip searches
in these cases against the Supreme Court decision of Bell v.
Wolfish. "0 In Bell, the Court had said that detainees arrested for
felonies can be subjected to strip searches because of security
concerns."' The Second Circuit analyzed Bell, and determined
that Bell had not read unreasonable searches out of the
constitution. 112 Generally, when persons are arrested for violent
crimes and drug crimes, there is a valid reason to search the
arrestee; the need to search for weapons and drugs. General
security concerns, however, were rejected as an excuse for a
blanket search, especially of people arrested for minor violations.
The court said in Weber, that the risk of a misdemeanant arrestee
introducing contraband into the general jail population simply did
not warrant strip searches of all arrestees. " 3
The three cases discussed below, Lee v. Perez,114 Shain v.
Ellison,'"5 and Oraolo v. City of New York, 116 were all decided in
the last two years, well after the unconstitutionality of blanket
strip search policies was clearly established in the Second
109 Id. at 68-69; Weber, 804 F.2d at 802.
10 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
.. id. at 559-60.
112 Weber, 804 F.2d at 800.
"' Id. at 802.
114 175 F. Supp. 2d 673 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
" 273 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2001).
116 216 F.3d 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 993 (2000).
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Circuit. 117 The three cases are not isolated incidents in this
circuit; they are merely three examples.118
Lee v. Perez
Frederick Lee's cousin was being evicted from her
apartment. The cousin called Lee to help her recover some of
her things. When Lee got to the apartment, the landlord would
not let him in. Lee called the police, and was subsequently
arrested when he attempted to leave the area when told not to do
so. He was charged with obstructing governmental
administration, disorderly conduct and criminal mischief," 19 taken
to the police station and held for arraignment. After his
arraignment he was transported to another facility where he was
subjected to a strip and body cavity search. The personnel at the
facility had no reason to suspect that Lee was carrying any
weapons or contraband on his person. The search was done
pursuant to the sheriff's policy whereby everyone who entered
the facility as a detainee was searched in this manner, even if he
or she was able to make bail and would never leave the general
processing area, as was the case in Lee. 
20
117 As a threshold matter, unless specifically noted, all of the cases cited
herein were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is the vehicle for seeking
damages or injunctive relief when a state actor has violated one's federal
constitutional rights. In addition, all of the cases were brought against
municipalities, as well as against individual defendants. In Monell v. New
York City Dep' of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court held
that municipalities are persons under § 1983, and therefore can be sued for
constitutional injuries. A municipality, however, cannot be held responsible
on a respondeat superior theory; liability may be imposed only if the plaintiff
can establish that his injuries were inflicted pursuant to an official policy or
custom. Id. at 690-94.
" See infra text accompanying notes 202-19 for other recent Second Circuit
cases.
"19 Lee, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 675. Disorderly conduct is a violation under
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.20, the other two charges are misdemeanors under
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 145 and § 195.05 (McKinney 2001).
20 Lee, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 675-79.
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Shain v. Ellison
Ray Shain was separated from his wife, but living in the
same house with her. Shain's wife had an order of protection
against him, but it had recently expired. After Shain purportedly
came into his wife's bedroom unbidden and unwelcome, his wife
called the police. The police decided to charge him with first
degree harassment, a class B misdemeanor, and to arrest him.
Shain was subsequently taken to the Nassau County Correctional
Center, booked, and subjected to a body cavity and strip search,
although the personnel at the jail had no reason to suspect that
Shain was carrying weapons or contraband on his person. He
was released the next day and sent home. 1
21
Ciraolo v. City of New York
Debra Ciraolo was involved in a legal dispute with her
next-door neighbor. One day, apparently in the midst of some
sort of argument, Ciraolo's neighbor called the police, who
subsequently arrested Ciraolo, charging her with aggravated
harassment in the second degree, a misdemeanor. She was taken
to Central Booking to be processed, and there she was subjected
to a strip and body cavity search, even though the police had no
cause to suspect that Ciraolo was carrying weapons or contraband
on her person. The next day Ciraolo was released on her own
recognizance. 1
22
A. The Policies Are Freely Admitted To
In the Lee case, Judge McMahon had to direct a new trial
because although the jury had found that Lee had been strip-
searched, the jury also found that it was objectively reasonable
for the Sheriff to conduct that search. This finding clearly went
against the evidence in the case, for the Sheriff had admitted he
could not know what Lee had been charged with and he could not
have relied on any particular set of factors in deciding to search
121 Shain, 273 F.3d at 60.
122 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 237.
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him.123 Judge McMahon commented that this was "an appalling
admission, in view of settled law" and vacated the jury verdict. 1
24
Lee did not seek injunctive relief.
B. The Typical Constitutional Injury Award
In Shain, the plaintiff successfully proved that his
constitutional rights had been violated and that the jail was not
entitled to qualified immunity for implementing its blanket strip
search policy. 25 Shain received one dollar in nominal damages
for this constitutional violation. 26 The plaintiff's request for an
injunction had not been addressed by the district court, and the
case was remanded for a determination on the issue of an
injunction. 27  Shain is currently on remand to Judge Wexler in
123 Lee, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 681.
124 id.
125 Shain, 273 F.3d at 62. The Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue of
whether it is unconstitutional to strip search an arrested misdemeanant when
there is no individualized suspicion that the arrestee is carrying contraband or
weapons. The closest the issue ever came to that Court was the Sala case
which the Court remanded for the determination of damages under Owen. See
supra note 98. There was one dissenting vote in the Shain decision. Judge
Cabranes believed that the Supreme Court decision of Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78 (1987), controlled the outcome of the case. Shain, 273 F.3d at 70
(Cabranes, J., dissenting). In Turner, the Court held that the penological
interest of prison officials outweigh privacy interests of prisoners, and that a
very deferential standard must be used in favor of the officials in evaluating
any case concerning detainee or prisoner's rights. Turner, 482 U.S at 89-90.
The majority of the Second Circuit distinguished Turner and continued to rely
on the precedent of the circuit. Shain, 273 F.3d at 65-66. It remains an open
question. However, the case of Atwater may shed some light on where the
Supreme Court might stand on the Turner holding as applied to arrested
misdemeanants. In Atwater, the Court noted, in particular, that Mrs.
Atwater's privacy had not been unduly interfered with. Atwater, 532 U.S. at
354 (conceding that plaintiff's arrest was humiliating, but not more harmful to
her privacy interests than the normal custodial arrest). The Court stated that if
the police had subjected her to any unreasonable privacy deprivations she
would have had an individualized cause of action for that reason. Id. at 352-
53.
126 Shain, 273 F.3d at 62.
117 Id. at 67.
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the Eastern District of New York to determine the injunctive
relief claim.128 The odds of an injunction being issued in that
case are improbable considering the current state of the law, but
one can only hope that someone may have the right arguments to
overcome nearly twenty years of a ham-strung federal court.
C. Actual and Punitive Damages
In Ciraolo, the concurring opinion only briefly mentioned
an injunction, saying that "standing doctrine . . . generally
precludes a § 1983 plaintiff from obtaining injunctive relief unless
she can demonstrate that she is likely to be subjected to the same
conduct in the future, a showing that can be very difficult to
make." 29  In Ciraolo, the plaintiff was able to prove actual
damages to a jury. She had suffered posttraumatic stress as a
result of the incident, and had incurred medical bills. 130 The jury
awarded her $19,645 in compensatory damages. 
31
More interestingly, the jury also awarded her $5,000,000
in punitive damages when it found that the City had acted in
wanton disregard of Ciraolo's rights.132  The district court
concluded that punitive damages were available in this case
because the City policy was contrary to well settled law in this
circuit. 33 The district court had charged the jury "to consider
whether compensatory damages would be adequate to deter future
unlawful conduct." 134 On appeal, however, the punitive damage
award was set aside. 1
35
The circuit court was obviously displeased with the result
in this case. First, it was uncertain whether the jury would have
awarded Ciraolo more compensatory damages had they known
128 Id.
129 Craolo, 216 F.3d at 248 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (citing Lyons as the
basis for his conclusion).
130 Id. at 237.
'31 d. at 238.
132 id.
133 id.
134 Craolo, 216 F.3d at 238.
135 Id. at 242.
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they could not award her punitive damages. 136 Second, the court
was frustrated by the fact that the police department readily
admitted to its unconstitutional policy, but there was very little
the court could do about it. 137 Relying on City of Newport v.
Fact Concerts, 38 the circuit court said, "While we emphatically
deplore the City's conduct in adopting a policy that this Circuit
had earlier clearly held unconstitutional, the taxpayers themselves
cannot be held to be responsible for the policy .... ,, '3
In City of Newport, the Supreme Court held that
municipalities are not liable for punitive damages in § 1983
claims because if punitive damages are assessed the entity that is
really being punished is the taxpayer, not the responsible officials
or the municipality. 140 The Court held that although punitive
damages are not specifically precluded under § 1983, to punish a
municipality is not "sensible." 14' The Court said, 1) it was
unclear that municipal officers would be deterred by the damage
awards, since the cost was born by the taxpayers, 2) voters would
still be likely to vote wrongdoing officials out of office because
they had done wrong, and because of compensatory damage
awards, 3) if punitive damages were assessed at all, they should
be assessed directly against the officials and 4) punitive damages
could risk a city's financial integrity.
142
The Court also said that municipal immunity from
punitive damages was "well established" when Congress enacted
the Civil Rights Act of 1871.143 Therefore, it must be presumed
that the legislature intended to preserve that principle unless the
statute clearly indicates otherwise.'" Although the Court alluded
136 Id. at 242 n.2.
'1 Id. at 242 ("We are seriously troubled by the City's adoption of a policy
we had previously held unconstitutional.").
138 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
'39 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 241-42.
'40 City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 263.
141 Id. at 267.
142 Id. at 270.
143 Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13, § 1 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
1983); City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 263.
'" City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 263; see also Katt v. City of New York,
151 F. Supp. 2d 313, 332-33 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (explaining the Supreme
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to cases where it may be just to hold the taxpayer responsible for
constitutional violations, the Court said, however, those cases
would be rare. 14
5
In Ciraolo, the plaintiff argued to the Second Circuit that
she should be able to keep the $5,000,000 punitive damage award
because of the exception to municipal punitive damages left open
in City of Newport. 146 She argued that because of the particularly
"outrageous abuse" suffered at the hands of the police, this case
should be one of the exceptions to the non-liability rule. 147 The
Second Circuit analyzed Ciraolo's claim and decided that her case
did not fit into one of those 'rare' categories. 14  The court
interpreted the narrow exception the Supreme Court had left open
in City of Newport to be an exception for cases where it would be
justifiable to punish abuses for which the taxpayers were directly
responsible. 49 "Although it could be argued that, to the extent
that they are also voters who play a part in choosing municipal
officials, taxpayers are always responsible for municipal policies.
. . .,150 However, the court found this correlation too indirect.
The court considered that there could be cases where the
taxpayers themselves were responsible for an invalid policy; for
example, if there were a referendum instituting such a policy -
that would present a closer link.
5 1
Court's reasoning in Newport and finding that the City is not liable in punitive
damages under New York City's Human Rights Law for substantially the same
reasons).
'41 City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 267 n.29.
'46 Cirolo, 216 F.3d at 238.




' Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 240. Judge Katzmann, who concurred in the
reversal of the punitive award, specifically declined to join in the speculation
as to what type of exceptions to the non-liability rule the footnote in City of
Newport might have created. "Whatever the nature of any exception created
by footnote 29 . . . 'such an occurrence is sufficiently unlikely that we need
not anticipate it here.'" Id. at 250-51 (Katzmann, J., concurring in part)
(quoting City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 267 n.29).
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Judge Calabresi wrote a lengthy concurring opinion in
Ciraolo, where he acknowledged that the Supreme Court
precedents controlled the outcome of the case, but believed that
"the policies behind punitive damages and the purpose of § 1983
would be better furthered by a different outcome." 152 According
to Judge Calabresi, the continuing practice of strip searches
should be analyzed under a cost-benefit analysis. A city will
usually be "influenced by the extent to which it is made to bear
the costs associated with its behavior." 153 But, strip search cases,
usually with low compensatory damage awards, will not add up
to enough disincentive to persuade the City to change its
behavior. He called this phenomenon "underdeterrence." 1
54
First, Judge Calabresi argued that not all injured parties
sue for these injuries, especially when they know how low a
compensatory award will be, or even worse, that they might
receive only one dollar in nominal damages for the constitutional
injury. Second, harms that disproportionately affect the poor are
less likely to be redressed because the poor are frequently not
able to bring suit to redress their injuries, or even if able, there is
little incentive for them to do so "given the lack of sympathy this
group of plaintiffs can expect from the trier of fact." 155  Judge
Calabresi felt that in this case using punitive damages as a
deterrent, instead of as retribution, would be appropriate.
I respectfully suggest that the purpose of § 1983,
to protect federal constitutional rights against
infringement by state actors, is not served when -
as in the case before us - the prospect of damages
awarded pursuant to the statute manifestly fails to
deter a municipality from adopting a policy that it
2 Id. at 242 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
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clearly knows or should know violates the Fourth
Amendment. 156
A different analysis of how damages affect a city's
behavior can be found in the opinion of Professor Susan Bandes,
who says that plaintiffs are denied standing and therefore can
only seek damages "instead of seeking the appropriate system-
wide declaratory and injunctive relief."1 57  This only works,
Bandes argues, if the defendants are individual wrongdoers, but if
the governmental problem is systemic, damages do not work. "It
is often far easier to ask the taxpayer to pay and pay than to take
the politically risky position that the police department has to
change its wrongful practices." '58
Judge Calabresi believed that a possible solution might lie
in the class action suit. However, he believed that a class action
had its own problems: the loss of plaintiff autonomy; the expense
of administering the class; possible conflicts among class
members; and possible problems in meeting the numerosity
requirement for some municipal behavior. 
59
E. The Class Action
If underdeterrence was the problem with New York City
at the time of the Ciraolo decision, then theoretically, it should no
longer be the problem. A $50,000,000 class action suit, Tyson v.
New York City,16° which sought damages for misdemeanants
subjected to New York City's blanket strip search policy, settled
on June 13, 2001, a year after Ciraolo, and sixteen years after the
Weber decision.
Plaintiffs in the case were arrested for such things as
driving with a suspended driver's license, loitering, and jumping
156 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 250.
157 Bandes, supra note 63, at 1338 (emphasis added).
158 Id.
9 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 248 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
'60 No. 97-CIV-3762 (S.D.N.Y.) (J. S. Martin).
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a subway turnstile.' 6' Danni Tyson, the named plaintiff, was
arrested because she asked a police officer to move out of the
way so that she could board a train; he purportedly arrested her
because she "wouldn't stop talking." 162 The Tyson class action
settled for up to $50,000,000, depending upon the number of
plaintiffs who come forward to claim damages. 63 It is estimated
that between 57,000 and 65,000 people were illegally searched in
accordance with New York City's blanket strip search policy
between July 1996 and May 1997.164 According to the plaintiff's
lawyer, Richard Emery, this was the largest settlement of a civil
rights lawsuit against a municipality in the United States. 
65
Meanwhile, in Nassau County, three separate class
actions were filed very soon after Judge Wexler announced his
intention to grant summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff in
the Shain case.' 66  The three class actions, Augustin v.
Jablonsky, O'Day v. Nassau County, and Iaffaldano v. Nassau
County, were consolidated in March 2001. However, in Augustin
after consolidating the cases, Judge Hurley decided that a class
action would not be the most efficient way of dealing with the
plaintiff's claims. He said that this was not primarily an
injunctive class seeking damages as a secondary issue; this was
primarily a damage suit, and the plaintiffs claims did not have
enough commonality. 167 On the plaintiffs leave to reconsider,
Judge Hurley affirmed the denial of the class certification. 68 The
Second Circuit refused to hear the case on appeal and affirmed by
161 Benjamin Weiser, New York Will Pay $50 Million In 50,000 Illegal Strip
Searches, N.Y. TIMEs, January 10, 2001, at Al.
162 CNN TODAY, January 10, 2001 Trans # 01011007V13 (quote from Danni
Tyson).
163 Today's News Update, 6/14/2001 N.Y.L.J. 1. (col. 1).
'64 Henry Goldman, Judge Approves $50 Million payment in NYC Strip
Search Lawsuit, BLOOMBERG NEws, June 13, 2001.
165 Id.
66 Augustin v. Jablonsky, 3/28/2001 N.Y.L.J. 31, (col. 3) (E.D.N.Y.).
167 Id.
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order. 169  It was estimated in Augustin that the plaintiff class
would have consisted of approximately 19,000 persons. 1
70
The question remains, however, as to whether the
policies have been discontinued. In Augustin, Judge Hurley said
that the plaintiffs injunctive claim was most likely moot because
defendant Nassau County had changed its strip search policy right
after the Shain decision.' 71 Similarly, speaking for New York
City's policy, Bernard Kerik said, "When it was brought to the
Department's attention that the policy of strip-searching all pre-
arraignment detainees was inappropriate, the practice was stopped
immediately." 72  If the municipalities have changed their
policies, that may be the end of the problem for now.
Nevertheless, one must still wonder if it should take sixteen
years, perhaps up to 84,000 constitutional injuries and a huge
expenditure by the taxpayers to halt unconstitutional behavior by
our police.
One must also wonder if the purported voluntary
compliance is sufficient at this point, since the police departments
could re-institute their policies at any time. An illustration of this
concern is Mary Novak, an. 82-year old Brooklyn resident who
alleges she was arrested by the N.Y.P.D for playing 'rap' music
too loudly, and then subjected to a "humiliating" strip search.'
73
The purported search of 1s. Novak occurred after the Tyson
settlement. 74  Apparently, $50,000,000 later, New York City
may still be underdeterred.
169 Today's News Update, 6/26/2001 N.Y.L.J. 1, (col. 1).
'70 Augustin, 3/28/2001 N.Y.L.J. 31, (col. 3).
171 Id. Arguably, under the Lyons reasoning, if the claim is moot, then the
court can grant standing for an injunction under the "capable of repetition, yet
evading review" doctrine. However, also following the Lyons reasoning, the
behavior is not moot because the county could decide to reinstate its policy at
any time.
172 Weiser, supra, note 161.
173 Susan Saulny, Charges Dropped, Woman Alleges Strip Search and Plans
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IV. OTHER CIRCUITS: A SAMPLING OF THE EFFECTS OF
LYONS
The Ninth Circuit is where Lyons originated, and
ironically, that same Circuit was one of the last to realize the full
import of the Supreme Court's disposition of the case. Just a few
months after Lyons, the Ninth Circuit, in Gonzalez v.
Peoria,175distinguished Lyons and held that because the damage
claim and the injunctive claim were brought at the same time, and
the relief sprang from the same set of operative facts, the plaintiff
had standing for injunctive relief. 176 This reasoning resulted in
several cases where the Circuit court issued injunctions in
circumstances that seemed to implicate the Supreme Court's
Lyons decision. 177
Notably, one of those cases, Giles v. Ackerman,
discussed below, concerned an unconstitutional strip search
policy. 7 8 Even more notably, one of those cases, Nava v. City of
Dublin, decided in 1997, concerned issuing an injunction against
the California Highway Patrol for their choke hold policy. 179 The
court in Nava actually admitted that the case seemed "remarkably
similar" to the Lyons case.180  And it was remarkably similar,
except for one small fact; in Nava, the plaintiff had died after
being choked for only a few seconds, and the executor of the
decedent's estate maintained the suit.' 8' Fifteen years after the
' 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled by Hodgers-Durgin v. De La
Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
116 Id. at 481 (deciding ultimately not to issue an injunction because it was
not clear that the police had a "policy" that needed to be redressed).
177 See also Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1987)
(reinstating a claim for injunctive relief against Fontana police practice of
discriminating against blacks suspects, involving an arrestee who was placed in
a choke hold, then beaten, and then shot in the back), overruled by Hodgers-
Durgin, 199 F.3d at 1037.
' 746 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985),
overruled by Hodgers-Durgin, 199 F.3d at 1037.
"9 121 F.3d 453, 454 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled by Hodgers-Durgin, 199
F.3d at 1037.
Io Id. at 455.
... Id. at 454.
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Lyons decision, California police still used the choke hold
restraint. Obviously, damage suits were an underdeterrent in
California also. It was not until 1999 in the case of Hodgers-
Durgin v. De La Vina,182 that the Ninth Circuit court, en banc,
reconsidered its circuit precedent in light of Lyons, and expressly
overruled the line of cases that had been inconsistent with
Lyons. 183
In the Seventh Circuit, in Williams v. City of Chicago,'
a plaintiff representing herself and all others similarly situated,
arrestees who had been illegally detained for more than 72 hours
without a probable cause or a bond hearing, lacked standing to
seek injunctive relief. The court said that the plaintiff could not
show that she would again be detained in the future, citing the
Lyons decision.185 The court acknowledged that because of the
length of the detention periods involved, it was unlikely that an
arrestee could ever have enough time to file a complaint before he
or she was released. The court continued:
As a result, the federal courts are rendered
impotent to order the cessation of a policy which
may indeed be unconstitutional and may harm
many persons. Nevertheless, the Court is
constrained by Lyons and other Supreme Court
decisions to limit its censure of unconstitutional
police practices as alleged here to individual
awards of money damages. 1
86
Four years after the Williams case, came Robinson v. City
of Chicago,187 a consolidated appeal of two separate suits which
stated the same complaint as Williams had, and had exactly the
same outcome; no named plaintiff in either action had standing to
sue. 188 The district court found that the City of Chicago routinely
held misdemeanants in detention while "ostensibly" clearing their
199 F.3d at 1037.
Id. at 1040.
184 609 F. Supp. 1017 (D.C. 11. 1985).
' Id. at 1018.
116 Id. at 1020 n.7.
117 868 F.2d 959 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1035 (1990).
8 ld. at 966.
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fingerprints, but actually, the detainment was punishment for the
misdemeanors themselves. 18 9 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held
that just as in Lyons, the plaintiffs could not allege that they
would again encounter the police because their future conduct
would presumably give the police no cause to arrest them.19°
More recently in the Seventh Circuit, the Lyons decision was
prevalent in determining the plaintiffs' lack of standing in a racial
profiling case brought under Title VI. 19'
In the Second Circuit, shortly after the Lyons decision was
issued, the court had to reverse an injunction issued by the
District Court of Connecticut. In Curtis v. City of New Haven,1
92
the plaintiffs had successfully proved that the police had
negligently sprayed mace into their faces and eyes and failed to
give plaintiffs prompt medical attention, and that the city had not
properly trained the police officers in the use of the substance.1
93
The District Court issued the injunction, and then six days later,
the Supreme Court decided the Lyons case.194 On rehearing, the
District Court would not set aside the injunction, instead it
distinguished Lyons on the ground that this case involved a policy
or custom of the police department. 1
95
Judge Pratt, writing for the Second Circuit panel noted
that Lyons was not distinguishable here; "Plaintiffs have not
alleged that it is likely that they will be stopped by City police in
the future and, for no reason and without provocation, assaulted
with mace and not given treatment afterward." 196
"89 Id. at 965.
,90 Id. at 966.
" Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11976 *9-*67.
But see Rodriguez v. California Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131 (N.D.
Cal. 2000) (finding in a similar Title VI case that plaintiffs might be able to
show a likelihood of future injury, and that the plaintiffs' claim survived a
motion to dismiss).
'9' 726 F.2d 65, 65 (2d Cir. 1984).
'93 Id. at 66.
94Id. at67.
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V. STRIP SEARCH CASES IN OTHER Cmcurrs
All of the Federal Circuits have passed on the strip search
problem, and the circuit courts are unanimous that the behavior is
unconstitutional when applying the balancing test as set forth in
the case of Bell. In addition to the Sala case, discussed
previously in Part I, four other courts issued injunctions;
however, three of those cases were decided in 1977, 1979 and
1981, pre-Lyons. In the fourth, the defendant failed to appeal the
injunction, and the Circuit court, recognizing the plaintiff did not
have standing for an injunction in light of Lyons, would not
reverse the injunction sua sponte. In one other case, an
injunction resulted as part of a stipulation of settlement in a class
action suit. The rest of the cases either do not mention
injunctions at all, 197 or the court explains why it cannot issue one.
The following excerpts tell the story.
First Circuit:
1997, Swain v. Spinney. 198  Holding: "A strip search of
an arrestee must be justified, at the least, by a reasonable
suspicion. " 199 Plaintiff, who was strip-searched because her
boyfriend was caught shoplifting, while boyfriend was not strip-
searched, stated a trial-worthy claim. "If there was an objective
basis - apart from retaliation - for stripping Swain, it would have
been objectively reasonable to search [the boyfriend] as well." 
200
"Our Circuit has 'recognized, as have all courts that have
considered the issue, the severe if not gross interference with a
person's privacy that occurs when guards conduct a visual
inspection of body cavities."' 20 1 Injunctive relief is not
mentioned.
197 Most of the cases are appellate cases, and the injunction claim may have
been dismissed below and not appealed, or it might not have been part of the
plaintiffs claim at all. In light of the Lyons precedent, the former rationale
seems most likely.
'9' 117 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997).
99 Id. at 5.
200 Id. at.9.
201 Id. at 6 (citing Arruda v. Fair, 710 F.2d 886, 887 (1st Cir. 1983)).
394 [Vol 18
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2002, Murcia v. County of Orange.2 °2 Excerpt: The
plaintiff was arrested in a case of mistaken identity, and subjected
to four separate strip searches.203 The case arose in the same
county and before the same Judge as the Lee case discussed in
Part III. The defendants attempted to argue that the sheriff is a
state official, entitled to eleventh amendment immunity under
§ 1983. 204 The court took great umbrage at this argument:
The law in this Circuit is EXTREMELY well
settled; counties, not the State, are liable in
damages if sheriffs, acting as head of a county
correctional facility, promulgate unconstitutional
strip search policies and County officials remain
deliberately indifferent to that policy . . . .Indeed,
the law is so well settled that Orange County could
not possibly have a good faith basis for asserting
that it is not liable for [these] policies . . . .The
county is warned: the next time any of its many
lawyers... tries to make this argument in front of
this judge, the County and its counsel will be
sanctioned for frivolous litigation tactics.
205
Injunctive relief was not mentioned in this decision.
2001, Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady.206  Holding: The
city's policy of strip searching all detainees, regardless of their
individual circumstances, was unconstitutional under the clearly
established precedent of the circuit.20 7 Injunctive relief was not
mentioned.
2000, Mason v. Village of Babylon.2 s Holding: "It is the
clear law in this circuit that the Fourth Amendment precludes
prison officials from performing strip searches of arrestees
202 185 F. Supp. 2d 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
203 Id. at 290.
204 Id. at 292.
20 Id. at 292-93.
206 141 F. Supp. 2d 304 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).
207 Id. at 307.
208 124 F. Supp. 2d 807 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
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charged with misdemeanor or minor offenses absent a reasonable
suspicion that the person being searched is concealing weapons or
other contraband. , 209 The plaintiff had been arrested and then
subsequently strip searched because of a mistake made at the
courthouse. Someone had forgotten to cancel a warrant issued on
an unpaid ticket; the ticket was for a broken tail light. The court
reserved for trial the issues of damages, qualified immunity and
municipal liability. 210 No mention was made of injunctive relief.
2000, Sorensen v. City of New York. 211 Holding: Jury
award of $60,000 in punitive damages had to be set aside
because, "[t]he Ciraolo decision is dispositive here and the award
of punitive damages cannot be sustained." 212 "Somehow, a
decade after the Weber decision, it appears that the Police
Department and/or the Department of Correction were still not
abiding by the law." 213 "[T]he fact that the City of New York
countenanced this lawlessness, at least until recently, and long
after the Circuit Court of Appeals decision, stretches credulity.
•"214 Injunctive relief is not mentioned.
1999, Flores v. City of Mount Vernon.215 Excerpt: "The
utterly outrageous facts of this matter are not in dispute. " 216 The
plaintiff was subjected to a full body cavity strip search "pursuant
to an admitted policy of the city of strip searching everyone who
was arrested for narcotics activity. " 217 What made the case so
outrageous was that Mrs. Flores "WAS NOT CHARGED WITH
ANY CRIME;" she was brought to the station house "FOR THE
SOLE PURPOSE OF BEING SEARCHED." 218 The court said,
"That turns the Constitution on its head and violates Mrs. Flores'
209 Id. at 815.
210 Id. at 817.
2. 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15090.
212 Id. at *23.
213 Id. at *43.
214 Id. at *46.
215 41 F. Supp. 2d 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
216 Id. at 440.
21 7 Id. at 446.
218 Id. at 445 (emphasis in original).
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right to be free from unwarranted searches. " 219 The court did
not mention injunctive relief.
Third Circuit:
1993, Newkirk v. Sheers.220 Holding: The court analyzed
the decisions from eight other circuits and agreed that a
particularized suspicion was required to strip search arrestees
under the Bell balancing test.22' It also held that in the wake of
decisional law in eight other Courts of Appeals, the law was
clearly established, and the defendants were not entitled to
qualified immunity. 222  The plaintiffs had been arrested in
connection with a non-violent animal rights protest. They had
tried to save pigeons from being shot by sportsmen in a "pigeon
shoot" and were charged with theft.223 They were subjected to a
strip / body cavity search pursuant to a blanket strip search policy
implemented by the county.224  No mention was made of
injunctive relief.
Fourth Circuit:
1981, Logan v. Shealy.22 ' Holding: Permanent injunction
entered against the county's strip search policy. The policy was
"conclusively shown to be unconstitutional," notwithstanding the
fact that the Sheriff revised the policy after the suit was
instituted. 226 This injunction, issued in 1981, pre-dated the Lyons
decision.
2 19 Id.
220 834 F. Supp. 772 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
221 Id. at 791.
222 id.
223 Id. at 775.
224 Id. at 777.
22' 660 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Clements v. Logan,
455 U.S. 942 (1982).
226 Id. at 1013.
2002
35
Hark: Strip Search Policies
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2002
TOURO LAW REVIEW
Fifth Circuit:
1985, Stewart v. Lubbock County.2 27  Holding: The
circuit court ruled that although the district court issued a
permanent injunction, the defendant did not appeal that part of the
decision; therefore, the issue was not before the court. If the
issue had been before the court, it would have reversed the
injunction because of the recent Supreme Court decision of
Lyons. 228  The dissent in the case argued that standing is a
jurisdictional matter, and that the court should have reversed the
injunction.229
Sixth Circuit:
1989, Masters v. Crouch.230 Holding: It was clearly
established in 1986 that authorities may not strip search persons
arrested for minor violations absent reasonable suspicion that the
detainee is carrying weapons or contraband.23' Plaintiff had
erroneously been told the incorrect date to appear in court for a
traffic ticket, and was subsequently- arrested for failing to appear.
Although the plaintiff specifically requested a permanent
injunction, the issue was not addressed on appeal, nor was
mention made of the district court's disposition of that part of her
claim.
Seventh Circuit:
1979, Tinetti v. Wittke.2 32 Holding: Arrestees for minor
offenses may be subjected to a strip search only if jail officials
have probable cause to believe that arrestees are concealing
weapons or contraband.233 The court found that the case was not
moot even though the defendants had changed the policy, because
the issue was "capable of repetition yet evading review." As to
227 767 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1066 (1986).
22 Id. at 155 n.3.
229 Id. at 157 (Hinojosa, J., dissenting).
230 872 F.2d 1248 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Frey v. Masters, 493
U.S. 973 (1989).
231 Id. at 1255.
232 620 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1980) aff'g, 479 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
233 Tinetti, 479 F. Supp. at 491.
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plaintiffs standing, the court said that although the plaintiff
brought the claim as an individual and not as part of a class
action, "the requested injunctive relief is appropriate when it will
benefit the claimant and all others subject to the practice under
attack." The court quoted extensively from Judge Pratt's
decision in Sala.234 This injunction issued in 1979, pre-Lyons.
1982, Jane Does v. City of Chicago.235 Stipulation of
Settlement: The parties settled the plaintiff's claims for injunctive
relief "whereby the City was permanently enjoined from
instituting strip searches or body cavity searches on women and
not similarly situated men charged with traffic, regulatory or
misdemeanor offenses unless there was reason to believe that the
arrestee was concealing weapons or contraband."
1983, Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago.236 Holding:
Plaintiffs of the Jane Doe class action entitled to damages for the
same behavior found unconstitutional in that case.237
Eighth Circuit:
1985, John Does 1-100 v. Boyd.23s Holding: Although
the policy of the county of strip searching every detainee is
unconstitutional, the class can not be certified as a Rule 23(b)(2)
class because the plaintiffs do not have standing under the
Supreme Court decision in Lyons. "The named plaintiffs cannot
establish a credible threat that they will be arrested again."2 39
7-u Id.
'3S No. 79 C 789 (N.D. Ill. Jan 12, 1982). Subsequent to the class action
suit, the Illinois legislature modified its "Rights on Arrest" statute to make the
practice unlawful. MaryBeth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1266 n.2
(7th Cir. 1983); see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 5/103-1 (Smith-Hurd
1992).
236 723 F.2d at 1263.
237 Id. at 1272 (the court relied partly on the decision of Tinetti, which in
turn had relied on Sala). Many of the other circuits in turn rely on Mary Beth
G., and actually attribute Judge Pratt's language from Saa to the Mary Beth
G. case.
3 613 F. Supp. 1514 (D.C. Minn. 1985).
239 Id. at 1529.
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1985, Jones v. Edwards.24° Holding: Security concerns
cannot justify a blanket deprivation of rights of the kind incurred
here. 24' "We hold that the fourth amendment's protection against
the kind of search of which Jones complains was well-settled at
the time his search took place." 242  No mention was made of
injunctive relief.
Ninth Circuit:
1984, Giles v. Ackerman.243 Holding: The county's
policy of strip-searching all detainees without reasonable
suspicion was unconstitutional as a matter of law.244  The
following portion of the decision of the court was subsequently
overruled:
Gile's request for injunctive and declaratory relief
does not raise the issue of standing considered by
the Supreme Court in City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons. In Lyons the plaintiff's damages claim had
been severed from his claim for injunctive relied.
The Court was thus required to consider whether
his request for an injunction, standing alone,
presented a case or controversy. In contrast, it is
clear that Giles has standing to bring her damages
action and there is no question that a live
controversy exists between her and the County.
245
1986, Ward v. County of San Diego.246 Holding: The
County's policy of a blanket strip search of all arrestees without
requiring that there be reasonable suspicion the arrestee is hiding
240 770 F.2d 739 (8th Cir. 1985).
241 Id. at 742.
242 Id. (citing Seventh and Ninth Circuit precedent and the wording of the
Fourth Amendment itself).
243 746 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1984), cen. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985), later
overruled by Hodgers-Durgin, 199 F.3d at 1037.
244 Id. at 619.
245 Id.
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weapons or contraband is unconstitutional. 247  The County and
the sheriff are not entitled to qualified immunity because the law
was clearly established at the time the incident took place that this
type of search was unlawful. 248 However, the injunction issued
by the district court was reversed as improvidently granted
because of the Supreme Court decision in Lyons.249
Tenth Circuit:
1993, Chapman v. Nichols.250 Holding: The law was
clearly established that a policy that subjects all detainees to a
strip search, without regard to reasonable suspicion that the
detainee is carrying weapons or contraband is unconstitutional;
there is no qualified immunity available for having such a
policy.251 No mentioned was made of an injunction.
1984, Hill v. Bogans.252 Holding: Plaintiff, who was
arrested for an outstanding speeding ticket, and strip searched in
a hallway with ten to twelve onlookers present, was entitled to a
trial on the issue of damages.253 No mention was made of an
injunction, though the court did mention that partly in response to
the incident, the Colorado legislature had enacted a statute
proscribing strip searches.2 5
Eleventh Circuit:
2000, Skurstenis v. Jones.25 5 Holding: The policy of the
Jail which requires that each inmate be strip searched, and does
not require any reasonable suspicion before doing so, does not
247 Id. at 1332.
248 Id. at 1333.
249 id.
250 989 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1993).
251 Id. at 397.
252 735 F.2d 391 (10th Cir. 1984).
253 Id. at 394-95.
254 COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-3-405(1) (2001) precludes blanket strip searches
of arrestees unless there is a reasonable belief that the person is concealing
contraband or a controlled substance; see also IOWA CODE § 804.30 (1994)
(same); VA. CODE ANN, § 19.2-59.1 (Michie 2000) (same).
25 236 F.3d 678 (1 1th Cir. 2000).
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256comport with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. The
court in this case, however, found that the search of this
particular plaintiff was constitutional because she had a weapon in
her possession when arrested.257 The issue of an injunction was
not mentioned.
D.C. Circuit:
2002, Helton v. United States.25 8  Holding: The
defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claim for invasion of
privacy under the Federal Tort Claims Act denied.259 Plaintiffs
were arrested when taking part in a non-violent animal rights
demonstration and were subsequently arrested and strip searched.
The defendant argued that in order to prevail on an intrusion on
seclusion claim, the invasion must rise to a level of a violation of
the right to privacy protected by the Constitution.260 The court
believed the plaintiffs could easily make that showing based upon
the precedent of most of the federal court of appeals, "some
dating back over two decades" holding that these blanket policies
are unconstitutional.26' Plaintiffs were only requesting damages,
not injunctive relief.
1977, Tatum v. Morton.262  A group of Quakers, who
were peacefully demonstrating outside of the White House were
arrested, and many of them were subjected to strip searches. The
Circuit court said that "strip searches in the absence of any basis
for suspicion of concealment of weapons, contraband or evidence
was [a] ... Fourth Amendment violation." 263 The court did not
issue an injunction noting that another case had recently done so,
prohibiting the District of Columbia police from conducting strip
256 Id. at 682.
257 id.
25S 191 F. Supp. 2d 179 (D.D.C. 2002).
259 Id. at 184.
260 Id. at 183.
261 Id. at 184.
262 562 F.2d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
263 Id. at 1284.
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searches on parking and traffic arrestees without probable cause
to suspect hidden weapons or contraband.26
VI. UTILIZING THE STATE COURTS
What most plaintiffs lawyers have overlooked in the
Lyon's decision is the clear direction by the Court that cases
seeking injunctions against state police powers should be taken up
in the state courts. 265  " [T]he state courts need not impose the
same standing or remedial requirements that govern federal court
proceedings. The individual states may permit their courts to use
injunctions to oversee the conduct of law enforcement authorities
on a continuing basis." 266
Article II standing is a jurisdictional requirement in
federal court, but state courts are free to have their own standing
requirements. 267  "The States are thus left free as a matter of
their own procedural law to determine whether their courts may
issue advisory opinions or to determine matters that would not
satisfy the more stringent requirement in the federal courts that an
actual case or controversy be presented for resolution." 
268
The only New York state court decision research has
uncovered on the strip search issue is the Second Department case
Huck v. City of Newburgh,269 where a female misdemeanant,
arrested for having an unlicensed dog, was subjected to an
unconstitutional strip search pursuant to a city policy. 270  The
plaintiff in Huck, however, did not request injunctive relief. If
she had, she may have been able to get standing in the state court
proceeding.
264 Id. at 1284 n. 14 (citing Civ. No. 75-2058 (D.D.C.)).
265 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 113.
26 id.
267 For attorneys interested in a full discussion of litigating a § 1983 case in
state court there is a two volume treatise on the subject by STEVEN H.
STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN STATE COuRTs (CBC 1996 & West
Group Supp. 1997-2001).
268 New York State Club Assoc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
269 275 A.D.2d 343, 344, 712 N.Y.S.2d 149, 151 (2d Dep't 2000).
270 d. at 344-45, 712 N.Y.S.2d at 151.
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The New York Court of Appeals explained the historical
requirement of standing in the case of The Society of the Plastics
Industry v. County of Suffolk.27' The court stated that the
requirement of a case. or controversy long pre-dated the federal
constitution.272 It was a common-law doctrine that insured that
the party requesting relief had an actual stake in the dispute; an
"injury in fact" was required so that a court was not being asked
to merely render an advisory opinion.273 See also New York City
Coalition for the Preservation of Gardens v. Guiliani,274 which
states that a party must establish an injury in fact; "some concrete
interest capable of sound and enduring judicial resolution. "
275
While New York has the same requirements for standing
as the federal courts generally, it does recognize an important
exception to the mootness doctrine. A claim is usually
considered moot unless the rights of the parties will be directly
affected by the judgment.276 However, there is an exception for
cases that present "important and recurring issues which, by
virtue or their relatively brief existence, would be rendered
otherwise nonreviewable. "277 There are usually "three common
factors, (1) a likelihood of repetition, either between the parties
or among other members of the public; (2) a phenomenon
typically evading review; and (3) a showing of significant or
important questions not previously passed on .... 27 Perhaps,
if the strip search cases had been brought in a New York State
court, the practice of blanket strip search policies would have
been enjoined many years (and many taxpayer dollars) ago.
271 77 N.Y.2d 761, 573 N.E.2d 1034, 570 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1991).
272 Id. at 772, 573 N.E.2d at 1040, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 784.
273 Id. at 772-73, 573 N.E.2d at 1040, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 784.
274 175 Misc. 2d 644, 670 N.Y.S.2d 654 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1997), aff'd 246 A.D.2d 399, 666 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1st Dep't 1998).
27 Id. at 650, 670 N.Y.S.2d at 659.
276 In re Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 714, 409 N.E.2d 876, 878,
431 N.Y.S.2d 400, 402 (1980).
277 Id. (citing Roe v. Wade).
27 Id. at 714-15, 409 N.E. at 878, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 402 (emphasis added).
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There are other states that have made exceptions to the
standing requirements of Article III. In Duhon v. Gravet, 279 a
§ 1983 case from Arkansas, a plaintiff brought suit to declare that
Arkansas' post-judgment execution laws were unconstitutional.
The plaintiff, before trial, recovered her-property, and dismissed
her claim against the retailer; however, she pressed the
constitutional claim. The court held that although the issue was
moot, it was still justiciable because "where considerations of
public interest or the prevention of future litigation are present,
the choice remains ours as to whether we may elect to settle an
issue, even though moot. Future litigation may well be curtailed
by our decision to resolve the issues presented in this appeal. 
" 280
The court noted that "a substantial question exists underlying the
constitutionality of Arkansas' writ of execution laws" that could
affect many people.28'
Similarly, the Hawaii Supreme Court in Pele Defense
Fund v. Paty,28 2 explains that the standing barrier for that state's
court is lower in cases which are of concern to the public
interest. 28 3  "Regardless of the standing theory, 'the crucial
inquiry is "whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of
... [the court's] jurisdiction and to justify exercise of this court's
remedial powers on his behalf."'"284 So that rights of the public
will not be deprived of a judicial forum, the court had held in an
earlier decision "that a member of the public can sue to enforce
the rights of the public generally, if he can show that he had
suffered an injury in fact, and that the concerns of a multiplicity
of suits are satisfied by any means, including a class action. "
28 5
279 790 S.W.2d 155 (Ark. 1990).
280 Id. at 156.
281 Id.
282 837 P.2d 1247 (Haw. 1992).
283 Id. at 1257.
24 Id. (citations omitted).
285 Id. (citing Akau v. Olohana Corp., 652 P.2d 1130, 1134 (Haw. 1982)).
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There are similar cases arising in Missouri, Utah, Wisconsin,
Texas and Maine.286
A very interesting case arose in California, White v.
Davis, where police practices were challenged as a taxpayer's suit
to enjoin the spending of public funds for illegal police activity.287
The court held that under California's taxpayer suit provision, no
special harm to the named plaintiffs need be shown, the purpose
of the provision is to allow the "citizenry to challenge
governmental action which would otherwise go unchallenged in
the courts because of the standing requirement." 288 It seems that
someone could very well challenge the choke hold policy under
this provision in California state court. Compare White with
Langford v. Gates,289 also brought as a California taxpayer suit,
but brought in federal district court. In Lang ford, the plaintiffs
challenged the illegal police conduct of the use of battering rams
and grenades to storm residential structures suspected as places of
unlawful narcotics activity.290 In federal court, it was determined
that the plaintiffs lacked a sufficient 'nexus' as taxpayers and the
claim to be adjudicated sufficient to assure a personal stake in the
outcome to satisfy the Article III case or controversy
requirement. 291 Three of the plaintiffs had been in a house that
had been stormed in such manner, yet they did not meet the
'substantial nexus' test under Article III analysis.292
There are also some state courts that require standing for
§ 1983 actions in the same way. that the federal courts require it.
For example, in Langton v. Secretary of Public Safety,293 the
Appeals Court of Massachusetts held that under § 1983 "a
286 See Steven H. Steinglass, 1 15T ANNUAL SECrION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS
LITIGATION, Litigating Section 1983 Actions in State Court, 124-33 (Practicing
Law Institute 1999) (surveying many state decisions which have allowed
standing for § 1983 claims, that would not have had standing if brought in
federal court).
287 533 P.2d 222, 225 (Cal. 1975).
288 Id. at 227.
289 610 F. Supp. 120 (C.D. Cal. 1985)
290 Id. at 120.
291 Id. at 121.
292 Id. at 121-22.
293 636 N.E.2d 299 (Mass. 1994).
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plaintiff must show that he has a 'personal stake in the outcome'
and that 'he personally has suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the
defendant.'" 294 The Supreme Court of Oregon recently held that
more stringent state standing requirements may not be applied in
§ 1983 claims heard in state court, however, it left open the
question as to whether state justiciability standards would apply if
those standards would be more favorable to a plaintiff instead of
less favorable.295
It seems that the state courts that follow the federal
standing requirements in this area should rethink the Lyons
holding, and its myriad of implications, for currently, it seems
that the state courts are the only judicial avenue left to wield some
power over police activity that may run afoul of the Fourth
Amendment.
VII. CONCLUSION
The strip search cases may be a chapter that is finally
closing. The extensive publicity over the Tyson class action in
New York City was hopefully a wake-up call for other
municipalities. Yet, other problems persist, such as the choke
hold policy in California, the illegal detainment of misdemeanants
in Chicago, and the recent wave of racial profiling cases.
I realize we are living in a time when there are many valid
security concerns facing our nation; however, it is just in such
times of crisis that we should be the most vigilant in protecting
our constitutional rights. For all too often, what we are willing
to let happen because it is a time of crisis becomes a great
blemish on our country and our legal system. Hirabayashi v.
United States29and Korematsu v. United States2 97 painfully
proved that point. "[F]ew indeed have been the invasions upon
294 d. at 303 (citing to federal case law).
295 Barcik v. Kubiaczyk, 895 P.2d 765, 772-73 (Ore. 1995).
296 320 U.S. 81, 98-99 (1943) (upholding a curfew of all citizens of Japanese
ancestry in certain areas because it was justified by emergency).
297 323 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1944) (upholding exclusion order of all citizens of
Japanese ancestry from West Coast areas due to military emergency).
2002 407
45
Hark: Strip Search Policies
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2002
TOURO LAW REVIEW
essential liberties which have not been accompanied by pleas of
urgent necessity advanced in good faith by responsible men." 
29 8
Now, as the government is instituting more and more
security measures, and is giving more power to police
departments, we are without a method of attacking those
measures if they go too far. The loop-hole opened in City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons should be closed, and the federal courts should
be re-granted the power they were always meant to have, the
power to enjoin unconstitutional behavior by anyone acting under
"color of any" 299 law.
298 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 113 (Murphy, J., concurring).
29 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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